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Notes
CONTRIBUTIONS TO THIS ISSUE
MISSOURI INcomE, TAX LAW As RETROSPECTIvE LEGISLATION. By
James C. Porter.
Mr. Porter, an alumnus of Washington University and member of
the St. Louis Bar, discusses the changes made in the state income
tax law by the Act of 1927. He gives special attention to the ques-
tion of whether or not this is retrospective legislation.
JUDICIAL FINDINGS OF FACT UNDER THE MISSOURI CODE. By Tyr-
rell Williams.
Mr. Williams, Professor of Law at Washington University, traces
the history of findings by the courts from the time of the adoption
of the code to the present. Mr. Williams teaches the Procedure
courses in the School of Law.
P. TAYLOR BRYAN
WALTER D. COLES
E DwA C. ELiOr
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A FEDERAL ANTI-LYNCHING BILL. By
Hon. L. C. Dyer and George C. Dyer.
This article was prepared by George C. Dyer, a Senior in the Wash-
ington University School of Law, with suggestions and criticisms
given him by Hon. L. C. Dyer, Representative in Congress for the
Twelfth Congressional District of Missouri, and author of the pro-
posed Anti-Lynching Bill which the article discusses.
In addition to the regular members of the staff, the following students
in the School of Law have written Case Comments: Max Soffer,
Morris Cohn, J. J. Chused, and Robert Bruce Snow, Jr.
ACTIONS AT LAW BETWEEN PARTNERS IN MISSOURI
AS COMPARED WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Prior to the decision in 1897 of Willis v. Barron,' it was well settled
in Missouri that no action at law could be maintained by one partner
against his firm or associate for money arising out of and connected with
partnership business until there had been a settlement of the partnership
accounts.2 The reason for the rule was twofold, formal and sub-
stantive. The formal barrier to the suit at law grew out of the fact
that the partnership, as such, had no judicial existence as distinguished
from the persons composing it,3 and could sue and be sued only in the
names of its individual partners joined in the proceeding. To be both
plaintiff and defendant involved an inconsistency which the law does
not permit. The result would be, moreover, that the law would give
force to a contract which a man made with himself, and in the event
that he should recover a judgment, he might be called upon as a mem-
ber of the firm to pay it.
The substantive barrier to the action is the truer and more precise
reason.' It results from the principle that a partner's interest in the
partnership's effects is not his aliquot part thereof, but is his proper
share in the balance of the surplus remaining after the payment of the
'143 Mo. 450, 45 S. W. 289, 65 Am. St. Rep. 673.
'Stothert v. Knox, 5 Mo. 112; McKnight v. McCutchen, 27 Mo. 436; Bam-
brick v. Simms, 102 Mo. 158, 14 S. W. 935.
'Willis v. Barron, slupra; Cutting v. Daigneau, 151 Mass. 297, 23 N. E. 839;
Summerson v. Donovan, 110 Va. 657, 66 S. E. 822; Bond v. Bemis, 55 Mo. 524.
'Cutting v. Daigneau, supra; Mulhall v. Cheatham, 1 Mo. App. 476. In Stod-
dard v. Wood, 9 Gray 90, the court stated: "The difficulty is not merely a mat-
ter of parties; it lies much deeper. A promise by a partner to the partnership
is a promise to pay himself with other persons; and it cannot be said that any-
thing is due until the whole is settled, until all the assets are collected, and all
the debts paid. Until then, it cannot be known where there is any balance due;
still less, what that balance is."
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